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Introduction
Two years ago, former New Zealand Prime
Minister Helen Clark expressed growing con-
cern for the stability and prosperity of her
Pacific neighbors. “The South Pacific in the
twenty-first century is not quite how Rodgers
and Hammerstein portrayed it in the 1958 film,”
Clark said. (Clark) Despite pristine white-sand
beaches, hypnotic blue lagoons, and warm trop-
ical breezes, the island nations of the South
Pacific face serious, and seriously debilitating,
challenges. The dangers are both internal and
external and span a range of geographic, cul-
tural, economic, political, environmental, and
global issues. Fragile physical environments,
limited natural resources, rapid population
growth, high unemployment rates, low primary
school enrollment, deep-seated ethnic ten-
sion, violent military coups, inadequate health
care services, deteriorating financial systems,
corrupt public officials, and dysfunctional law
and justice systems are a glimpse of the Pacific
reality. In addition to these domestic disabili-
ties, failing Pacific Island states struggle to cope
with transnational concerns such as human and
drug trafficking, refugees, identity fraud, money
laundering, infectious diseases, and environ-
mental degradation, while threats of interna-
tional terrorism and nuclear proliferation fur-
ther jeopardize the peace and security of the
Pacific region.
New Zealand cannot afford to overlook the
problems facing its neighboring Pacific islands.
New Zealand itself risks facing domestic insta-
bility if the diverse challenges of failing Pacific
Island states are not addressed. “The Pacific is
at risk of falling victim to all the wasted poten-
tial and social and economic chaos that poverty
brings. Unless we want these problems even-
tually to become our own, New Zealand, as a
strong and prosperous neighbour, must try to
prevent this happening,” says Winston Peters,
former New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs.
FINANCING A REVOLUTION: 
NEW ZEALAND’S STRATEGY 
TO ELIMINATE POVERTY IN THE 
SOUTH PACIFIC
Katherine A. Ginda
Ehara taku toa i te toa takitahi, –engari he toa takitini.
(My strength is not mine alone, but that of the multitude.)
— A M–aori proverb
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(Peters) As Pacific Island nations struggle to
establish credible political institutions, sophis-
ticated economic policies, equitable social
conditions, and sustainable environmental prac-
tices, it is in New Zealand’s best interest to
assume a proactive leadership position within
the region and remain involved in affairs abroad.
“What happens in the Pacific impacts directly
on New Zealand, and on the quality of life, safety,
health, and security of every New Zealander. The
more successful the Pacific is, the better it is for
us,” Peters says. (Peters)
In order to provide the direction and
resources that failing Pacific nations so des-
perately need, the New Zealand government
conceived and launched in June 2008 a compre-
hensive development program designed to sig-
nificantly reduce poverty and hardship through-
out the Pacific region by 2015. The resulting
Pacific Development Strategy (PDS) was a polit-
ical milestone, New Zealand’s first regional
assistance program dedicated to poverty elimi-
nation in the Pacific. But, with the region at a
pivotal “crossroads between poverty and pros-
perity” (Peters) that will inevitably impact
New Zealand’s own internal stability, the Pacific
Development Strategy has been criticized by
government officials as incomplete and inade-
quate. The PDS leaves questions about its 
ability to achieve long-term sustainability; and
without devoted leadership, responsible man-
agement, clear objectives, and prioritized goals,
it will struggle to achieve a meaningful differ-
ence in the lives of Pacific Islanders.
This article provides a critical analysis of
the Pacific Development Strategy and examines,
in particular, its potential to revolutionize, and
revitalize, the Pacific region. The first section
explores in greater detail the crushing challenges
facing poverty-stricken Pacific Island states
and the need for considerable financial assistance
and forceful intervention in order to initiate
recovery. The following section introduces
New Zealand as a regional leader and commit-
ted activist, and outlines the goals and initiatives
of its Pacific Development Strategy. The third
section discusses the strategy’s shortcomings
and presents recommendations for revision. The
final section suggests that the Pacific Develop-
ment Strategy must be amended in order to be
a success; unchanged, it will fail to realize the
ambitious results it hopes to achieve.
Island “Paradise” 
Geographically remote, culturally diverse,
economically underdeveloped, politically
volatile, and environmentally fragile, the island
nations of the South Pacific make up one of
the most unique, and uniquely challenged,
regions in the world. More than 10,000 islands,
the majority uninhabited, dot the Pacific.
(“Oceania”) Scattered across an ocean desert
exceeding 63 million square miles, these nations
are virtually isolated from the rest of the world
and are nearly inaccessible. (“Pacific Ocean”)
Thousands of miles of open ocean separate most
South Pacific islands from the closest major
international city. Nadi, Fiji, the center of the
South Pacific, is more than 1,300 miles from
Auckland, New Zealand; nearly 2,000 miles from
Sydney, Australia; and more than 5,500 miles (a
10-hour flight) from Los Angeles.1 Fast, direct
travel between island destinations is nearly
impossible; the infrastructure simply does not
exist, and the travel and trade industries that do
exist are unsustainable. In 2008, the Samoan
and Tongan governments turned to New
Zealand in desperation and requested support
for air routes to and from Los Angeles, vital
tourism arteries for the two island destinations.
In February 2009 the New Zealand government
announced its decision to underwrite the routes
for the next year in order to help retain the
crumbling assets. (McCully, “Time . . .”) Finan-
cially strapped and internally unstable, many
Pacific Island nations are unable to maintain
crucial transport networks; and without outside
investment, future access to the Pacific Islands
may be further limited, and the islands them-
selves further isolated.
Despite this pronounced geographic insu-
lation from the outside world, the Pacific peo-
ple are one of the most culturally diverse pop-
ulations in the world. As Figure 1 shows, Pacific
Islanders are roughly divided into three broad
ethnogeographic groups — Melanesian, Poly-
nesian, and Micronesian — but the individual
Pacific Island states face even further cultural
variation within their own populations. Eight
hundred and twenty different indigenous lan-
guages, over one-tenth of the world’s total, are
1According to calculations by mapcrow.info and 
airpacific.com.
spoken in Papua New Guinea alone. (“Papua
New Guinea”) Solomon Islanders speak another
120 indigenous languages. (“Solomon Islands”)
This extreme cultural diversity is often cited
as an underlying cause of cultural instability and
ethnic conflict. Over the past two decades,
severe violence has erupted between clashing
cultures in Papua New Guinea, the Solomon
Islands, and Fiji. These three island nations,
in particular, have been seriously weakened by
internal conflict and continue to struggle to
solve their deep-seated issues of ethnicity and
repair their damaged governments, economies,
and people. Though relatively peaceful now,
these countries will require strengthened gov-
ernments capable of maintaining law and order,
restructured economies conducive to youthful
and entrepreneurial ambitions, accountable
leadership endowed with integrity and self-
lessness, and “considerable external assistance”
in order to find permanent solutions. (Levine,
p. 617) In addition to ethnic strife, many Pacific
Island populations also exhibit high growth
rates. As Table 1 shows, Papua New Guinea,
the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu all face
annual population growth rates approaching
three percent, which well exceed annual eco-
nomic growth rates. For example, 40 percent of
people in Papua New Guinea already live in
poverty, while its population of approximately 6
million is expected to double in only 25 years.
(“NZAID Making a Difference in Papua . . .”) This
rapid population growth is often the source of
poor economic conditions.
Pacific Island economies are some of the
most volatile and vulnerable in the world. As
Table 1 illustrates, poverty and hardship are
widespread. The estimated GDP per person in
the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea,
two Melanesian countries with the lowest stan-
dards of living in the region, is U.S. $513 and U.S.
$695, respectively. Thirty-eight percent of people
in Kiribati and 26 percent in Vanuatu earn less
than U.S. $1 per day. Most Pacific Island
economies are severely underdeveloped, focus-
ing on agriculturally based and low-value prod-
ucts. Eighty percent of the population in Vanu-
atu are subsistence farmers and live in rural
areas, while 75 percent in the Solomon Islands
rely on subsistence farming and fishing for
their livelihoods. (“NZAID Making a Difference
in Vanuatu,” “NZAID Making a Difference in
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Figure 1
Oceania: Micronesia, Melanesia, and Polynesia
Source: Encyclopædia Britannica.
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Solomon . . .”) In Papua New Guinea, approxi-
mately 85 percent of the population lives in
rural areas, while income disparity and poverty
continue to grow. (“NZAID Making a Difference
in Papua . . .”) In addition, many Pacific Island
nations face natural and human resource con-
straints, limited skill bases, high transaction
costs, and diseconomies of scale. (“Pacific Strat-
egy . . . ,” p. 9) These economic disadvantages
are often compounded by complex social issues. 
Pacific Islanders face low health and edu-
cation standards, and for many these basic needs
are not met. Many Pacific children do not
receive an elementary education. Only 56 per-
cent of school-age children in the Solomon
Islands are currently enrolled in primary school,
and less than half the population over age 15 has
attained a primary level education. (“NZAID
Making a Difference in Solomon . . .”) A sig-
nificant number of Pacific Islanders do not have
access to basic health services. In Vanuatu, 20
percent are without health care. (“NZAID Mak-
ing a Difference in Vanuatu”) Many Pacific
Islanders suffer from deadly, but treatable and
preventable, diseases. Up to 75 percent of all
deaths in the Pacific are caused by heart disease
and diabetes, while malaria, tuberculosis, and
pneumonia also remain prevalent. (“NZ Com-
mitted . . .”) In Papua New Guinea, average
life expectancy is 57 years, and 8 out of every
100 children die before age 5. (“NZAID Mak-
ing a Difference in Papua . . .”) As Table 1 illus-
trates, infant mortality rates are high, especially
in the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea.
Papua New Guinea itself faces the highest inci-
dence of HIV in the Pacific region, and with-
out intervention the HIV/AIDS epidemic is
predicted to infect more than 500,000 people by
2025, with drastic consequences. The PNG
workforce will have declined by more than 12
percent, nearly 117,000 children will have lost
their mothers to AIDS, and 70 percent of all hos-
pital beds will be needed for AIDS patients.
(“HIV/AIDS . . .”)
Dysfunctional state institutions and polit-
ical misconduct exacerbate the region’s insta-
bility. Small island communities are often
controlled by corrupt elites, average citizens are
rendered helpless, weak guardians are unable to
protect the innocent, and the demand for trans-
parent, accountable government results in
regular coups and riots. According to Trans-
parency International’s Corruption Perceptions
Index for 2008, on a scale of zero to 10, from
highly corrupt to highly clean, Papua New
Guinea falls within a range of 1.6–2.3. In a rank-
Table 1
Poverty and Hardship in the Pacific, 2003
Population Land GDP Human % Below Infant
Area Per Development U.S. $1/Day Mortality
Person Index
Total population
(annual growth Per 1,000
rate) km2 U.S. $1 Rank Value live births
Kiribati 90,000 (2.2%) 730 633 n/a 0.515 38.0 43
Papua New 5,800,000 (2.5%) 462,840 695 137 0.523 30.0 69
Guinea
Solomon 521,000 (2.8%) 28,900 513 128 0.594 n/a 66
Islands
Tuvalu 11,000 (1.6%) 26 1,346 n/a 0.583 17.2 22
Vanuatu 213,000 (2.7%) 12,190 1,472 118 0.659 26 31
New Zealand 4,098,000 (1.37%) 270,530 19,800 19 0.933 n/a 6
Source: “Pacific Strategy . . . ,” p. 11.
ing of 180 countries, from least to most corrupt,
PNG came in at 151, while the Solomon Islands
and Vanuatu tied at 109. In April 2008, the Van-
uatu chapter of Transparency International (TI)
issued a press release titled “Has the Govern-
ment Lost Control of the Country?” With more
consultants now working in Vanuatu than police
officers, and with claims that not a single pair
of handcuffs exists in the entire country, the
TI chapter argues that it is no surprise the
people of Vanuatu feel the government has
handed over its country to criminals. “The
lack of law and order is becoming the single
most overwhelming problem facing this nation,
the one problem that on its own can destroy this
country because without law and order and a
feeling of personal security felt by the citizens
— all else crumbles,” the press release said.
(“Has the Government . . .”)
Apart from internal strife, the Pacific
Islands remain physically threatened by natural
disasters and climate change. In 1999 two
Kiribati islands disappeared under water due
to global warming and the rising sea level. At
280 square miles, the country’s total inhabita-
ble land could fit inside New York’s city limits,
and it continues to shrink. Kiribati President
Anote Tong has said he expects the region will
become unlivable in 50 years, and its nearly
100,000 residents will become the world’s first
environmental refugees. (Weir) Fearing a sim-
ilar fate, Tuvalu, one of the lowest-lying nations
in the world with a total surface area of only
10 square miles, has asked Australia and New
Zealand to open migration channels for its
10,000 citizens and, in a worst-case scenario,
accept the entire population and allow them
to function as a sovereign nation within foreign
borders. With the sea level rising at 5.7 millime-
ters per year, forecasters predict Tuvalu, like
Kiribati, will be uninhabitable by the end of
the century. (Crouch)
The Pacific region continues to face new
and serious challenges as globalization quick-
ens. The black market and organized crime
are healthy international enterprises in the
Pacific. Here, illegal drugs, false documentation,
identity fraud, money laundering, human traf-
ficking, and resource theft are robust and lucra-
tive businesses; and New Zealand feels its effects.
In June 2009 a New Zealand man was arrested
for allegedly issuing fake residency stamps
and visas to Pacific Islanders who had immi-
grated to New Zealand and stayed beyond their
visitor’s permits. The New Zealand Herald
reports that M–aori activist Gerrard Otimi admit-
ted to accepting NZ $500 per document from at
least 50 Pacific Islander overstayers. In
exchange, Otimi offered certified acceptance
into his M–aori tribe, or hap–u. Otimi says he
was trying to help Pacific Island families who
are desperate to stay in New Zealand by grant-
ing them M–aori membership and providing
the necessary immigration documents to nota-
rize their stay. In reality, the documents Otimi
authorized have no status with the Immigration
Department and do not give Pacific Islanders
any legal rights to stay in New Zealand. (“Police
Question Man . . .”) Radio New Zealand reports
that police have seized NZ $40,000 in cash
and 5,000 hap–u membership certificates 
from Otimi’s home. (“Gerrard Otimi . . .”) 
Otimi has also been forced to surrender his New
Zealand passport. (“Courts Have No Right . . .”)
This case is especially significant because it
establishes New Zealand’s susceptibility to inter-
national organized crime; with New Zealan-
ders capitalizing on Pacific strife and Pacific
Islanders now victimized on New Zealand soil,
New Zealand is no longer immune. 
The expansion of international terrorist
networks to rogue Pacific Island states has
also become a debatable threat. “Since the
September 11 tragedy, concern has risen that
so-called ‘failed states,’ losing the struggle to
maintain law and order at home, could become
springboards for terrorism,” says Tarcisius Tara
Kabutaulaka, a native of the Solomon Islands
who argues that his country, which recently set-
tled a civil war that rocked the nation for five
years and is still in the process of resolving
the turmoil completely, is among those “failed
states” susceptible to terrorist exploitation.
(Kabutaulaka) In June 2003, in order to prevent
possible terrorist influence and occupancy in
the Solomon Islands and to ensure regional
security, the Australian government launched
the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon
Islands (RAMSI) and intervened militarily in the
civil unrest wreaking havoc on the crippled
island nation. The intervention resulted in the
removal of thousands of weapons from the
country and the arrest of hundreds of delin-
quents and was considered an immediate suc-
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cess; but it failed to address the underlying
causes of ethnic conflict, and it leaves questions
about its ability to initiate long-term peace
and build a nation capable of preventing the
establishment of terrorist regimes. (Kabu-
taulaka) Today, the Solomon Islands and other
failing Pacific Island nations remain potential
havens for terrorist activity and therefore 
jeopardize the stability of their developed neigh-
bors. To ensure its own security, New Zealand
must keep watch for terrorists who can easily
prey on, lurk in, and attack from failing Pacific
states.
Kiwi Strategy 
New Zealand is attentive to these regional
challenges and is at the forefront of Pacific aid
and development programs. The New Zealand
Agency for International Development (NZAID),
the Wellington-based government agency
responsible for managing New Zealand’s Official
Development Assistance (ODA) program, pro-
vided nearly NZ $180 million in assistance to
the Pacific in 2007–2008, an increase of more
than NZ $17 million from the previous financial
year. (“NZAID Annual Review . . .”) To fund its
bilateral and regional programs for 2008–2009,
NZAID allocated an additional NZ $60 million
to the Pacific region. At NZ $242.7 million,
assistance to the Pacific accounts for more than
50 percent of the total aid budget and 70 
percent of total bilateral aid. (“Launch . . .”) 
Furthermore, in May 2009 the New Zealand gov-
ernment announced its decision to steadily
increase total overseas development assistance
over the next four years, from NZ $500 mil-
lion in 2009–2010 to NZ $600 million in
2012–2013, with the percentage allocated to the
Pacific region set to increase each year. (“Aid
Increases . . .”)
In June 2008, former Minister of Foreign
Affairs Winston Peters officially launched the
Pacific Development Strategy — an unprece-
dented eight-year, NZ $2 billion aid program
designed to significantly reduce poverty and
hardship across the Pacific region by 2015.
(“Launch . . .”) The strategy, which defines
New Zealand as a uniquely influential player
in promoting Pacific development due to its his-
torical and cultural linkages to the region,
sets four primary goals:
1. strengthen governance, 
2. achieve economic growth, 
3. improve health and education, 
4. reduce social and environmental vul-
nerability. (“Pacific Strategy . . . ,” p. 4)
The purpose of the Pacific Development
Strategy is to help the Pacific region not only
achieve poverty elimination but to reach an even
greater set of goals, called the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). This collection 
of eight goals, decided upon by the United 
Nations in September 2000 and reaffirmed in
2005, sets international poverty reduction and
development targets to be met by 2015.
(“Launch . . .”) The MDGs include eradicating
extreme poverty and hunger, achieving uni-
versal primary education, promoting gender
equality, reducing child mortality, improving
maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS and other
diseases, ensuring environmental sustain-
ability, and fostering global development part-
nerships. (“Pacific Strategy . . . ,” p. 36) The
Pacific is currently the most off-target and least
likely region in the world to achieve the MDGs,
after sub-Saharan Africa. (“Pacific Strategy . . . ,”
p. 9) The Pacific Development Strategy was
designed to help Pacific states get back on track
and indeed accomplish the UN’s lofty develop-
ment goals by 2015. (“Pacific Strategy . . . ,” 
p. 3) 
The first goal of the Pacific Development
Strategy is to strengthen governance across the
region. “New Zealand places a priority on this
area because we know that a stable and prosper-
ous Pacific requires good governance at all
levels,” Peters says. (Peters) Effective gover-
nance is considered not only a priority but a pre-
requisite for poverty reduction. (“Pacific Strat-
egy . . . ,” p. 15) The PDS argues that in the
absence of functional political systems, the
greater challenge of regional poverty elimina-
tion becomes an impossible feat. Therefore, the
first step in the development process is to
address and correct the destructive people, poli-
cies, and practices that currently govern the
Pacific region. Within the goal of strength-
ened governance, the strategy establishes three
targets:
1. responsible leadership,
2. democratic decision-making processes, 
3. efficient and accountable state institu-
tions. (“Pacific Strategy . . . ,” p. 15)
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The strategy outlines a wide range of initia-
tives designed to help the region achieve these
targets; among the most significant are those
that revolve around capacity-building. These ini-
tiatives help Pacific communities develop the
capacity to solve their own problems, rather
than relying solely on foreign intervention
and financial aid for development. For example,
the strategy puts forth an initiative to help raise
public awareness across the region about the
roles and responsibilities of effective political
leaders. (“Pacific Strategy . . . ,” p. 15) This
initiative enables Pacific Islanders to assume a
much-needed watchdog role over their gov-
ernments and to form their own opinions about
their community leaders. With this knowl-
edge, Pacific Islanders are then able to act on
those opinions and call Pacific communities
to action in order to better society. Another
notable initiative that the strategy puts forth
is to provide Pacific leaders with the training
and mentoring opportunities necessary to
help them develop and practice effective leader-
ship skills. (“Pacific Strategy . . . ,” p. 15) This
initiative provides a forum for Pacific leaders to
develop themselves and, in turn, their com-
munities. Both initiatives are part of the strat-
egy’s repertoire of capacity-building initia-
tives, and each is designed to educate Pacific
Islanders to be educated — to be aware, to be
concerned, and to be involved. This is a life-
long lesson, and one that will undoubtedly help
the Pacific region achieve its goal of strength-
ened governance.
The second goal of the Pacific Develop-
ment Strategy is to achieve broad-based eco-
nomic growth. While strengthened governance
is considered a prerequisite for poverty reduc-
tion, “good governance alone will not lift peo-
ple out of poverty,” Peters says. (Peters) Like
effective governance, economic growth is a nec-
essary component of poverty alleviation, but “no
country in the world has achieved one with-
out the other.” (Peters) Both government and
economy must evolve together in order to com-
bat poverty. Within the goal of economic
growth, the strategy establishes three targets: 
1. policies that encourage increased eco-
nomic activity and competition,
2. markets that support the poor,
3. strengthened rural livelihoods. (“Pacific
Strategy . . . ,” p. 17) 
This goal puts forth an even lengthier list of ini-
tiatives than the first, but the message remains
the same: capacity-building is crucial in order
to attain the targets. For example, the strategy
includes an initiative to provide Pacific women
and youth with business and vocational train-
ing. (“Pacific Strategy . . . ,” p. 19) Another
initiative introduces producers and employers
to basic marketing and business management
skills. (“Pacific Strategy . . . ,” p. 19) These ini-
tiatives deliver results indirectly, providing tools
instead of dollars in order to effect change. This
arrangement discourages dependency on reg-
ular financial assistance from New Zealand
and other overseas development partners.
Instead, these initiatives ensure self-sufficiency
and empower Pacific communities. In this
way, Pacific Islanders learn to work with the
tools at hand and acquire the skills necessary to
repair and strengthen their own economies,
independently. 
The third and fourth goals of the strat-
egy — improving health and education, and
reducing social and environmental vulnerabil-
ity — work hand-in-hand with the previous two.
Without basic health care services, strong
educational systems, and sustainable social and
environmental practices, economic opportuni-
ties disappear, standards of living plummet, and
communities crumble. Development efforts
become severely limited in the midst of social
chaos. The PDS recognizes that strengthened
governance and economic growth both play a
direct role in poverty elimination, but it also rec-
ognizes that development remains impossible
without adequate health, education, social,
and environmental conditions. These compo-
nents play a supportive role in the fight against
poverty but are equally important elements of
the development campaign. Within the goal of
raising health and education standards, the
strategy establishes four targets: 
1. increased school attendance and access
to quality basic education,
2. increased scholarship opportunities and
formal training programs, 
3. accessible primary health care services,
4. improved health care delivery systems.
(“Pacific Strategy . . . ,” p. 22)
Additionally, the fourth goal of the strategy —
reducing environmental and social vulnerabil-
ity — establishes three targets: 
1. communities capable of resolving social
conflict,
2. sustainable resource management,
3. improved responses to natural disasters.
(“Pacific Strategy . . . ,” p. 25)
Corresponding initiatives for the third and fourth
goals include an array of programs; and, again,
the focus is on capacity-building. For exam-
ple, the third goal — improving health and edu-
cation — includes one initiative that provides
medical training for the treatment, manage-
ment, and prevention of a range of illnesses,
including malaria, measles, pneumonia, heart
disease, and diabetes. (“Pacific Strategy . . . ,”
p. 23) The fourth goal — reducing environmen-
tal and social vulnerability — puts forth another
initiative to provide instruction on responsible
resource and waste management. These capac-
ity-building initiatives help the Pacific people
help themselves by providing communities with
the knowledge that is critical to development.
As soon as Pacific Islanders learn to tackle and
solve their own problems, long-term solutions
are put into place. This underlying theme of
capacity-building is apparent and, as previously
mentioned, runs throughout the Pacific Devel-
opment Strategy. According to Gerald McGhie,
former director of the New Zealand Institute for
International Affairs, it is the one true solu-
tion to development success. “Imported solu-
tions can only go so far. What is needed is
imported partnerships, the aim of which would
be to engage the community at all levels to seek
their own answers.” (McGhie)
Realistic Expectations and Warranted
Skepticism
Former Foreign Affairs Minister Winston
Peters touts the Pacific Development Strat-
egy as a “well-coordinated” and “focused” pro-
gram that can help make “a real, lasting and
positive impact on people’s lives.” (“Pacific Strat-
egy . . . ,” p. 1) It is a promising, and poten-
tially ground-breaking, strategy; but Peters also
recognizes that it is merely a framework for suc-
cess and not a guarantee. In fact, Peters says the
Pacific Development Strategy is only “part of the
answer” to the question of poverty in the Pacific.
(Peters) While the PDS is propelled and funded
by the New Zealand government, Peters empha-
sizes that the strategy is not a unilateral effort.
Collaboration with Pacific communities is
crucial, and the PDS is equally dependent on
Pacific enterprise to effect change. 
Peters uses a Polynesian proverb to draw
an analogy. The proverb states, “To reach its des-
tination, the canoe must be paddled on both
sides.” (Peters) Success, he argues, is a joint
effort; and executing the Pacific Development
Strategy, like paddling the canoe, must be a joint
venture between the New Zealand government
and its Pacific counterparts. “This strategy is not
just about us: There is paddling to be done on
both sides,” Peters says. (Peters) New Zealand
expects its Pacific neighbors to not only par-
ticipate in the development process but to
assume the responsibility themselves and to “do
the work necessary to lift their own citizens out
of poverty.” (Peters) Pacific governments must
strive for self-improvement and must be fully
invested, and interested, in achieving their
development goals before progress can be made. 
While responsive and dedicated Pacific
leadership is an essential component of the
strategy’s success, Peters also recognizes the
importance of effective aid delivery. He insists
that the Pacific Development Strategy is a smart
campaign — a package of “well-managed and
strategically planned aid” that will result in tan-
gible improvements across the Pacific region.
(Peters) But current New Zealand Minister of
Foreign Affairs Murray McCully questions this
assertion, arguing that the government’s over-
seas development aid has historically been
largely ineffective in achieving its goals for
the Pacific. (McCully, “Speech . . .”) Peters notes
that New Zealand’s previous aid to the Pacific
has helped increase school attendance, improve
the quality of health services, combat the spread
of HIV/AIDS, and build vital infrastructure;
but McCully is skeptical. In spite of these
achievements, overall progress has been limited,
McCully argues, and living conditions across the
Pacific region remain “unacceptable.” (McCully,
“Speech . . .”) As he states further, “On the basis
that a key objective of our aid strategy should
be to reverse the negative trends that we see
in our own region, by any objective measure-
ment our policies simply have not succeeded.”
(McCully, “Speech . . .”)
McCully argues that New Zealand aid has
not produced significant or promising results
because it is poorly managed and often directed
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to unproductive Pacific bureaucracies or to New
Zealand bureaucrats themselves. An “unaccept-
able level of ticket-clipping” often takes place
within the New Zealand Agency for Interna-
tional Development and among its international
development partners, McCully notes. (McCully,
“Speech . . .”) Because of this, New Zealand’s
development aid is often butchered and incom-
plete upon delivery. “I cannot tell you pre-
cisely how much of the aid budget actually gets,
in cash or kind, to the intended recipients —
and that in itself is something of an indict-
ment of our system,” McCully says. (McCully,
“Speech . . .”) He does, however, note that
approximately eight percent of the entire aid
budget is spent on employing NZAID staff mem-
bers and officials. (McCully, “Speech . . .”) The
total aid budget reached NZ $471.9 million in
2008–2009. (“Aid Increases . . .”) According to
this statistic, NZAID employees were the recip-
ients of nearly NZ $38 million last year. This
does not bode well for the Pacific Develop-
ment Strategy. Considering its reputation for
excessive “ticket-clipping,” NZAID has poten-
tially set itself, and its policies, up for failure.
(McCully, “Speech . . .”) The agency has allo-
cated an initial NZ $2 billion in development aid
to the Pacific region through the Pacific Devel-
opment Strategy; but strict management of
the aid budget will be necessary in order for
its successful execution. Without responsible
and attentive New Zealand leadership, the funds
budgeted for PDS initiatives will not likely reach
their intended recipients in full, and what
remains may not be enough to achieve signifi-
cant or enduring results.
McCully also cites abstract vocabulary,
“lofty rhetoric,” and misguided priorities as
responsible for past ineffective aid policies.
(McCully, “Speech . . .”) He again traces the
problem back to the New Zealand Agency for
International Development, the source of the
Pacific Development Strategy. He argues that
NZAID’s mission to alleviate poverty is an
overambitious and unrealistic directive, one too
broad and ambiguous to guarantee results. New
Zealand’s international aid agency has grown
too fond of what he calls the “mantra” of
“poverty alleviation.” (McCully, “Speech . . .”)
But he labels this as an inadequate objective for
the overwhelming task of international devel-
opment. “Poverty alleviation is too lazy and
incoherent a guide for that very important pur-
pose,” McCully asserts. (McCully, “Speech . . .”)
To ensure the efficient and effective delivery of
future overseas development aid, McCully initi-
ated discussions to amend the government
agency’s own mandate. (McCully, “Speech . . .”)
The final revisions were announced in May
2009. The most significant of those revisions
was a redefined objective for New Zealand’s
development assistance to the Pacific — a
shift from “poverty elimination” to “sustainable
economic development” as its primary goal.
(McCully and Groser) It is important to note
that the Pacific Development Strategy makes
the same “lazy and incoherent” commitment to
poverty and hardship elimination as the New
Zealand Agency for International Development.
(McCully, “Speech . . .”) Like the NZAID man-
date, this must be addressed and amended,
according to McCully, in order to be truly effec-
tive. To be a successful endeavor, the PDS
must redefine its goals and translate its general,
ambiguous initiatives to clearly defined, exhaus-
tive prescriptions for Pacific improvement. Ded-
ication to poverty alleviation is simply not
enough.
Operating under the “nebulous concept” of
poverty elimination, the New Zealand Agency 
for International Development had previ-
ously lacked a clear set of priorities. (McCully,
“Speech . . .”) Now, under a revised mandate that
clearly establishes sustainable economic growth
as the top priority for Pacific development,
McCully has established new objectives, starting
with the task of expanding trade and building
infrastructure. This, McCully argues, is “one 
of the best ways that we can build the Pacific into
a stronger economic unit.” (McCully, “Time . . .”)
He emphasizes the vital role international
trade will play in this endeavor and has identi-
fied the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic
Relations (PACER) as a “key driver” in the push
toward economic progress. (McCully, “Time . . .”)
PACER — a comprehensive trade agreement
designed to tackle poverty and achieve economic
growth by correcting the staggering trade imbal-
ance between New Zealand and its Pacific neigh-
bors — serves as the precursor to a free trade
agreement between Australia, New Zealand, and
Pacific Island countries. As such, McCully asserts
that PACER will serve as an exceptionally use-
ful development tool.
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It is important to note that the second goal
of the Pacific Development Strategy — achiev-
ing broad-based economic growth — matches
NZAID’s new focus on economic sustainability
and international trade; but, unlike the revised
NZAID mandate, the PDS places an equal, if not
greater, emphasis on strengthening governance
— an approach McCully criticizes as ineffective.
In fact, he considers efforts to improve gover-
nance not only ineffective but a waste of both
time and money. According to McCully and 
Minister of Trade Tim Groser, “Far too much 
has been channeled into [Pacific] bureaucra-
cies. . . . These States are certainly weak. But yet
further growth of bureaucracy is not the
answer.” (McCully and Groser) What does this
mean for the PDS? It must revisit its goals,
rethink its priorities, and potentially modify
its emphasis on strengthened governance.
NZAID must analyze where and how meaning-
ful change can be accomplished in the Pacific,
and adjust its aid distribution and develop-
ment philosophy accordingly. 
Conclusion
To be successful, the Pacific Develop-
ment Strategy must respond to Foreign Affairs
Minister Murray McCully and his criticism of
the New Zealand Agency for International Devel-
opment and its previous aid policies. The Pacific
Development Strategy must be revised and, in
particular, incorporate devoted leadership,
responsible management, clear objectives, and
prioritized goals in order to ensure a successful
development campaign. McCully seems to imply
that the PDS is a premature policy — an under-
developed, and unfinished, plan that lacks the
necessary focus and level of detail required to
bring about significant and lasting change to the
Pacific. As is, the Pacific Development Strat-
egy is insufficient; and without modification
McCully suggests that it will fall short of its lofty
goals. 
Fortunately, former Foreign Affairs Minis-
ter Winston Peters describes the PDS as a
work in progress, and NZAID has promised that
the strategy will evolve. The agency plans to
review and update the PDS in 2011 to ensure
that it is on task and remains relevant to regional
changes and needs. (“Pacific Strategy . . . ,” 
p. 35) Peters recognizes that the Pacific Devel-
opment Strategy is not a perfect document; and
he acknowledges that there will be setbacks,
even mistakes and failures, along the path to
success that will require humility and adaptabil-
ity in order to overcome. Peters refers again
to the Polynesian proverb: 
New Zealand will do its share of the pad-
dling by sticking to its strategy; monitor-
ing it, and being flexible enough to change
direction when necessary. We will also be
realistic and patient. There is nothing easy
about delivering an effective aid pro-
gramme. . . . But the alternative is to do
nothing, and allow others to quickly and
perversely fill the void. . . . Instead, we
are doing something, so that the Pacific
may fulfill its unique and vibrant poten-
tial. (Peters)
New Zealand has expressed a genuine and vested
interest in the welfare of the Pacific. This, more
than anything, will ensure a bright and prosper-
ous future for the region.
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